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Introduction 
In my last paper, Being Certain About Uncertainty – Part 1, I left the reader with a question: Can 
we see extreme cost growth coming?  At the time, I had my reservations.  After all, numerous 
cost growth studies have been done over the years which led me to wonder if 1) could I really 
contribute anything new or useful to understanding cost growth, and 2) is it possible to identify 
indicators that would tell us that a project is going to experience extreme cost growth.  I quickly 
realized that this challenge requires more analytical muscle than my few brain cells can muster, 
so I asked Christian Smart to help. 
Christian brings a wealth of knowledge, experience, and analytical horsepower to 
understanding the causes of extreme cost growth.  He has written several award winning 
papers on cost risk analysis, uncertainty, and the portfolio effect.  With Christian’s help, I have 
been able to look at the problem both from both an analytical and a managerial standpoint.  His 
wisdom has provided valuable insights and he has not been hesitant to give me honest 
feedback on the goodness (or lack thereof) of my own ideas. 
In trying to identify the cause (or causes) of extreme cost growth, I quickly realized that despite 
one’s best efforts, we cannot escape the narrative fallacy.  For those of you who are new to this 
subject, the narrative fallacy is our ability to build stories about the past.  These stories both 
simplify events and create clear lines of cause and effect.  They lead us to believe that the world 
is predictable, that it makes sense.  Unfortunately, these stories also create the illusion that we 
truly understand the past, when in fact what we actually understand is our interpretation of the 
past and the evidence we have gathered to bolster that interpretation. 
Therefore, as you read this paper please keep in mind that Christian and I have brought our 
own stories and our own biases to this subject.  Using data and analytical techniques provides a 
certain amount of objectivity (though many of you understand that even data and analyses are 
subject to confirmation bias).  But at the end of the day we must recognize that we create our 
own stories of the past, interject our own views of cause and effect, and face our own 
limitations of understanding.  Despite our very human limitations, we hope that you find what 
we have to say interesting and illuminating. 
Defining Extreme Cost Growth 
There is no standard definition for extreme cost growth.  If costs grow on a given project to the 
point where the overall portfolio is affected, either by taking resources from other projects or 
preventing the establishment of new projects, then the cost growth is problematic, but is it 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180005523 2019-08-31T14:57:25+00:00Z
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extreme?  Congress has imposed on the Department of Defense a policy that directly specifies 
how DoD must address cost growth.  The key elements of that policy are summarized below. 
• In order to combat cost growth, Senator Sam Nunn and Representative Dave McCurdy 
established legislation in the early 1980s that required programs to report on significant 
cost growth and provided specific guidelines on what is considered a baseline breach. 
• A significant breach is 15% growth above the current baseline, or 30% above the original 
baseline. 
• A critical breach is 25% growth above the current baseline, or 50% above the original 
baseline. 
• Critical breaches can result in program cancellation unless the program is restructured 
and root-cause analysis is conducted on the program’s cost growth. 
So according to Nunn-McCurdy, cost growth of 25% or more could be considered extreme.  For 
NASA, the policy picture is a little murkier.  NASA has no legislative requirement that defines 
limits for reporting or taking action on cost growth, but; does state in governing documents 
that projects which exceed 30% cost growth could be rebaselined and a 10% cost growth must 
be reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
NASA has a specific analytical process for establishing the baseline on spaceflight projects 
above $250M life-cycle cost.  Called the joint cost schedule confidence level analysis, or more 
simply the Joint Confidence Level (JCL), this analysis combines cost uncertainties, schedule 
uncertainties, and risks into a Monte Carlo simulation that produces cost-schedule pairs and 
their associated confidence level.  NASA policy recommends budgeting projects at the 70% JCL, 
which is a point where both the cost and schedule have a 70% confidence level of being 
realized.  We will talk more about JCLs and their impact on cost growth later in the paper. 
For the purposes of this study we define extreme cost growth to be 100% or more above the 
initial baseline.  Since we are using mostly NASA data in our analysis, we established the 
baseline to be Systems Requirements Review (SRR).  We  realize that 100% is an arbitrary 
number.  In coming to this conclusion we considered that cost growth in the range of 25% to 
50% is not uncommon, nor is it even noteworthy, for high technology space programs.  Our 
stakeholders do not typically make that level of cost growth an issue.  Conversely, cost growth 
of 100% or more can prompt increased scrutiny by third part groups (such as GAO) and lead to 
Congressional action.  Cost growth between 50% and 100% could, under some circumstances, 
be considered extreme depending upon the collateral impacts.  Limiting extreme cost growth to 
100% or greater still provided a relatively large (18) and diverse set of projects for examination. 
A Few Lessons from History 
Those of you familiar with our work have seen bar graphs like the one shown in Exhibit 1 in our 
previous papers and presentations.  Despite changes in data composition (some old data 
removed, some new data added), the general shape is enduring.  Looking like a lognormal 
distribution, the data shows a few success stories (cost growth <= zero) and a few disasters 
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(cost growth >= 100%).  In fact, in this data set the number of the former is almost exactly equal 
to the number of the latter: 17 versus 18. 
 
Exhibit 1.  Historical Cost Growth Bar Chart. 
From our historical data set we can draw some common statistics.  The mean cost growth is 
56.2% with a standard deviation of 82.5%.  The median is 35.1%.  The best performing project 
had a cost underrun of -26.8%; the worst had a cost growth of 498.3%.   
Visually, the bar chart can be somewhat misleading.  Because the sizes of the bins change (from 
25% to 50% to 100%) the bar chart understates the size of the tail.  Plotting the frequency 
against the average percent growth, as shown in Exhibit 2, gives a truer representation of the 
possibility of extreme outcomes. 
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Exhibit 2.  Frequency Graph of Historical Data. 
With such a long, fat tail fitting a probability distribution proved to be a challenge.  In the end, 
Christian grafted a Pareto distribution onto a lognormal distribution to model the general trend.  
The Pareto distribution has a heavier tail than a lognormal distribution and is used to model 
extreme variations.  The logic and derivation behind the lognormal-Pareto splice is given in 
Appendix A.   
For the cost engineer, there are a few other important lessons that can be drawn from the 
historical data.  First, as explained in previous papers by the authors, analysts can develop 
enhanced Scenario-Based Risk (eSBR)  or calibration models using historical data.  Such models 
can provide a more realistic picture of project risk, can be used to perform a risk analysis in the 
absence of other information, and be used to validate (or perhaps invalidate) risk analyses 
developed by others. 
Second, using historical data, the analyst can look for relationships that could provide insight 
into a specific project’s potential for cost growth.  Interestingly, we found no correlation 
between the estimated cost and the cost growth percentage or the actual cost and percentage 
cost growth.  However, the data indicated a high correlation (cc = 0.91) between the cost 
estimate and the amount of cost growth and an equally high correlation between the actual 
cost and the amount of cost growth.  In fact, the relationship between estimated cost and 
actual cost can easily be predicted with a simple power function as shown in Exhibit 3. 
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Exhibit 3.  Relationship between Estimated and Actual Cost. 
The equation in Exhibit 3 demonstrates how easy the job of a NASA manager could be.  All they 
need to do is add 50% to any cost estimate coming from a project and their portfolio would 
average out to around zero percent cost growth.  However, managers often struggle with 
empirical information.  In the next section we explore the differences in how the project 
manager views the world versus the view of the cost analyst. 
The Cost Estimator and the Project Manager 
Key to understanding why extreme cost growth occurs is understanding the difference in how 
cost estimators and analysts view the world and how project managers view the world.  
Parametricians and other data driven analysts know the importance of historical data and how 
to effectively use that data to make cost estimates.  Cost estimators also know that performing 
cost estimates and analyses requires significant judgment.  For most of us, that judgment is 
developed through experience, and sometimes experience can be a hard teacher. 
Because our data is often messy and we know that predicting the future is challenging, good 
estimators learn to be comfortable with uncertainty and to see the world probabilistically.  
Developing credible estimates requires that we use all the information at our disposal, taking 
into account historical experience as well as the unique characteristics of the system we are 
estimating.  At the end of the day, we estimators know that what we put forth will be 
scrutinized by everyone in our management chain.  Therefore, we focus on being able to 
explain, defend, and support every decision, every bit of data, and every judgment, so that our 
results will be seen as credible. 
The project manager has a very different mindset than the cost estimator.  While we cost 
estimators see our estimate as the end product, the project manager sees our work merely as a 
means to an end.  Project managers are results driven.  They have a job to do, and that job is to 
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successfully complete the project.  Thus, to the project manager, the cost estimator is there to 
help them get the job done. 
Project managers see the world deterministically. In a deterministic view of the world, plans 
can be made, problems uncovered, and actions taken which lead to a successful result.  Yes, the 
good ones do recognize uncertainty, but they usually believe that uncertainty can be bounded 
in the same way a safety factor can be put on a bridge design.  Their deterministic view of the 
world leads to a problem known as the planning fallacy.  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
describe the planning fallacy as “plans and forecasts that are unrealistically close to best-case 
scenarios.”  In other words, the plans are success oriented. 
Because the continuation of government projects is dependent upon the support of key 
stakeholders, including politicians, good project managers know that they need a consistent 
message and that they must build and maintain relationships.  The consistent message is 
important for creating a sense of realism, excitement, and inevitability about a project.  Such 
messages are necessary when building advocacy among customers, stakeholders, and senior 
agency leaders.  A good project manager is a good salesperson for their project.  But sometimes 
the sales message does not agree with the analysis results. 
There is a natural tension between the cost estimator and the project manager.  The cost 
estimator is on a quest for knowledge and understanding.  The project manager is focused on 
achievement.   
It is in the melding of both points of view that success can be found.  Used correctly, the 
analysis community functions as a governor, keeping the results-focused optimism of the 
project manager in check.  As we will see, it is when an organization loses this tension between 
project advocacy and good estimating that the risk of extreme cost growth increases. 
History for Managers 
History for project managers is the same history that drives cost analysts.  Only the 
explanations have changed to protect the guilty.  Whereas the cost engineer sees trends and 
generalities, the project manager sees lessons learned.  Take a look at Exhibit 4, a nice summary 
of findings from previous NASA cost growth studies (see Appendix B for a list of the studies 
used in building the table). 
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Exhibit 4.  Summary of NASA Cost Growth Studies. 
Notice the top four reasons: inadequate project definition; optimistic cost estimates; 
unexecutable schedules; and inadequate risk assessments.  These are all management failures.  
Yes, you can blame the cost and schedule communities for being optimistic.  But those of us 
who have been in the business a few years know it is management that makes the final decision 
on cost and schedule, and management is rarely pessimistic. 
It is interesting to note that the number of reasons is increasing over time.  We are not sure if 
this is because NASA is getting better at identifying reasons for cost growth, or if we just fail to 
learn. 
Nevertheless, project managers like studies like these.  Why?  Because they explain cause and 
effect and lead to specific actions that can implemented.  Specific actions that address specific 
problems increase our confidence that we are doing the right things to ensure success, which 
helps with messaging and advocacy.  Good project managers do not see history in terms of 
warnings to be heeded, but rather as pointing out potential challenges that can be overcome 
(see planning fallacy above). 
History is an Illusion 
Obviously, history itself is not an illusion.  What is an illusion is our understanding of history.  
The illusion begins with cause and effect.  We all believe in cause and effect.  We us it every day 
to make decisions and for planning.  What we don’t realize is that what we believe is cause and 
what we believe is effect are influenced by a number of biases.  These biases lead to a 
distortion in our understanding which makes actions and outcomes seem more direct and 
linear than they really are.  For example, the representative bias, which causes us to value 
information that is more easily recalled, makes us susceptible to the influence of a good story, 
especially a story that plays to our stereotypes. 
Note that the cause and effect we speak of in the previous paragraph is not direct, physical 
cause and effect (I was hungry, so I bought lunch).  Rather, the types of cause and effect that 
Cost Growth Reasons 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Inadequate definitions prior to agency budget decision and to external commitments X X X X
Optimistic Cost Estimates/Estimating Errors X X X X
Inability to execute initial schedule baseline X X X X
Inadequate risk assessments X X X X
Higher technical complexity of projects than anticipated X X X X
Changes in Scope (Design/Content) X X X X
Inadequate assessment of impacts of schedule changes on cost X X X
Annual Funding instability X X
Eroding in-house technical expertise X X
Poor tracking of contractor requirements against plans X X
Launch Vehicle X
Reserve Position adequacy X X
Lack of Probabilistic estimating X X
"Go as you can afford" Approach X
Lack of formal document for recording key technical, schedule and programmatic 
assumptions (CARD)**
X
** CADRe has since been implemented as a requirement of NPR 7120.5
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are subject to biases and oversimplification are the explanations we create in the absence of 
knowledge and understanding; explanations for things like the outcomes of political races, 
macro-economic behavior, and cost growth on government projects. 
Heuristics are a codification of our incomplete understanding of cause and effect.  Heuristics 
that are intuitive, simple, and easily understood become the most powerful.  Despite their 
flawed foundation, many heuristics are useful.  For example, most people would agree that 
system complexity and cost are positively correlated.  Such a heuristic can have value when 
trying to provide a relative ranking in cost between two systems.  The problem arises when 
people treat a heuristic as fact rather than as a rule of thumb. 
Ultimately, as discussed in Part 1 of this paper, history fails us because of the Narrative Fallacy.  
For those of you who did not read “Being Certain about Uncertainty – Part 1,” the Narrative 
Fallacy, as defined by Nassim Taleb, is our ability to assign a linear narrative to history, to make 
events seem almost inevitable.  We simplify the past to make it more understandable and 
memorable.  What our simplification ignores is the impact of random events.   
We struggle with randomness.  If we believe that randomness plays a significant role in our lives 
then we are accepting that we have limited control over our future.  Such acceptance is hard.  It 
goes directly against our illusion of control, an illusion that is necessary for us to function.  
Daniel Kahneman, in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, gets right to the heart of why this is so 
difficult. 
The illusion that one has understood the past feeds the further illusion that one 
can predict and control the future.  These illusions are comforting.  They reduce 
the anxiety we would experience if we allowed ourselves to fully acknowledge 
the uncertainties of existence. (Thinking, Fast and Slow; pages 204-205) 
How does this set us up for failure?  The illusion that we understand history leads to an overly 
simplistic understanding of the past.  Because we believe we understand the past, we now 
believe that (within limits) the future is deterministic.  But to achieve a desired end result, we 
must plan to take the proper actions based on the correct set of initial conditions.  To create 
the perception that a project can be accomplished within a desired cost and schedule, a good 
project manager constructs a plausible scenario (plan) based on what is known today.  This 
plausible scenario becomes the basis for selling the project.   
For example, to save money a project manager may look for ways to use more heritage 
hardware.  A less ethical project manager might even go so far as to browbeat the poor cost 
engineer into assuming more heritage.  But let’s assume our project manager is ethical.  Even 
ethical project managers are going to work hard to solve the cost problem.  Sometimes the 
solution leads to what we have termed “over-specification.”   
An over-specified estimate is one which is based on a significant number of cost-saving 
assumptions.  These assumptions are critical to project success.  Over-specification also feeds 
9 
 
the illusion that we are reducing uncertainty, that we can determine our future.  But over-
specification comes with a very high price.  The greater the number of assumptions, the more 
risk we have of one or more of those assumptions failing to hold.  This is basic probability: the 
greater the number of events required for success, the greater the probability that at least one 
event will fail. 
The Triumph of Randomness 
In the prolog of his book Antifragile, Nassim Taleb defines three types of responses to exposure 
to negative events: fragile; robust; and antifragile.  Obviously, a fragile response is one that is 
harmed by a negative event.  A robust response is neither harmed nor helped.  An antifragile 
response is one that responds positively (it benefits) from harm or volatility.  For each of these 
responses Taleb defines systems, people, and institutions that are typical of the response.  He 
puts high technology projects in the fragile category. 
High technology projects are complex and fragile, small things can have large negative 
consequences.  To quote Taleb 
Complex Systems are full of interdependencies – hard to detect – and nonlinear 
responses. … Man-made complex systems tend to develop cascades and 
runaway chains of reactions that decrease, even eliminate, predictability and 
cause outsized events. (Antifragile, page 7) 
If you have studied the history of even a few high technology development projects (yes, I know 
what I just said about history) you will see that what Taleb says rings true.  It is extremely 
difficult to foresee, with any reasonable reliability, what will cause cost growth or how extreme 
that cost growth will be.   If we could, it would be relatively easy to identify and correct.  When 
we over-specify the conditions for a cost estimate, we think we are addressing and minimizing 
the possibility of cost growth, when in fact the opposite is true.  We have increased the 
complexity and interdependencies. 
Thus randomness can defeat our best laid plans.  An empirical study of NASA and DoD history 
shows that somewhere between 12% and 15% of all projects will experience cost growth of 
more than 100%, yet how many risk analyses have been done that show that level of potential 
growth in the tail?  We invariably provide input into our cost risk analyses based on the 
triangular distribution,  as if we can truly bound everything we believe we know and 
understand.  Yet the future continues to confound us with events and outcomes that we 
neither expect nor are adequately prepared for. 
To illustrate the dominance of randomness over specificity, I offer up the example of the 
Hubble Space Telescope.  The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) is an engineering marvel and a 
great scientific achievement.  It has literally rewritten textbooks.  Yet, as an example of how to 
manage a large, complex project, it was a failure.  In constant year dollars the development cost 
of HST grew 274%.  Originally planned to launch in 1983, it did not actually make it into space 
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until 1990.  Once in space, it was found to have a flawed primary mirror (due to a small fleck of 
reflective material being lost from an alignment rod) that had to be corrected. 
As in most cases of extreme cost growth, management attempted to discover the causes.  What 
they found was that a number of assumptions about the HST development were not realized.  
In some cases decisions made to reduce cost actually led to cost increases.  The findings by 
NASA management are summarized below. 
 HST had a complex management interface, with two lead NASA centers (Marshall Space 
Flight Center for the spacecraft, telescope, and overall system integration; Goddard 
Space Flight Center for the instruments and ground system) and two prime contractors 
(Lockheed for the spacecraft and Perkin Elmer for the telescope). 
 Assumed use of existing and standard space flight hardware did not materialize. 
 The original estimate did not include sufficient spares. 
 It was assumed that because HST was launched on the Space Shuttle, there would be 
large mass margins and that these margins would translate into cost savings.  In reality, 
weight growth exceeded the available margin and the design had to be light weighted. 
 The telescope was sold as design-to-cost with performance allowed to vary.  However, 
performance was held constant and cost increased. 
 Telescope contamination requirements increased. 
 Historical data indicating high costs for optics, fine guidance sensors, and optical 
structures was removed from the CERs. 
Particularly troubling is the last finding: removal of relevant data from the CERs.   A willingness 
to explain away the past as irrelevant to the future is a manifestation of the narrative fallacy.  
We believe we understand the past well enough so as not to make the same mistakes.  
Obviously NASA did not.  You would think that having endured the management and technical 
failures of HST, NASA management would approach the development of the next large space 
telescope with a measure of humility and circumspection.  How wrong you would be. 
Take a look at Exhibit 5.  Exhibit 5 compares the costs of HST and the James Webb Space 
Telescope (JWST) with their initial estimates.   
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Exhibit 5.  A History of Large Space Telescope Cost Estimates and Actuals. 
The early HST estimates were informed by an earlier telescope mission called OAO-B (OAO for 
Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, B because in NASA nomenclature spacecraft in a series are 
designated using letters on the ground, and numbers once they are launched into space).  OAO-
B suffered a launch failure and never reached orbit.  However, its development costs were well 
documented and used to develop an early analogy estimate for HST.  Of course management, 
being smarter because of history, believed that they could do better, and went forward with an 
estimate for HST that was over $400 million less than the analogy estimate and well short of 
the actual development cost.   
It took only a few short years for management to forget the lessons of HST.  When JWST was 
initially formulated in the late 1990’s the development cost was assumed to be only $1.464 
billion, or over $100M less than NASA’s commitment to Congress for HST!  This was despite the 
fact that JWST is larger and more complex that HST.  What could possibly justify such an 
estimate? 
In explaining what happened, I (Andy Prince) must expose my own culpability in creating the 
mess that was to come.  The program that was to become JWST began formulation in 1996.  
Then called the Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST), it was to be a follow-on to the Hubble 
Space Telescope (HST).  I was invited to attend a gathering of scientists, engineers, managers, 
and programmatic professionals where we were told, in no uncertain terms, that our job was to 
show how NGST could be design, built, and launched for $1B dollars.  Notice that our job was 
not to develop an estimate of the cost for NGST.  Rather, our job was to justify an estimate 
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being handed down from the highest levels of NASA.  So we did our job.  We produced a report 
showing how it could be done and even included the phrase “…our costs are realistic and 
conservative.”  We did this despite knowing that HST had cost over $3.3B to develop in 1996 
dollars.   
Why Extreme Cost Growth Occurs 
To this point we have looked at the empirical history of cost growth and seen that extreme cost 
growth is real, and that it occurs with some regularity.  We have examined the psychology of 
why management fails to grasp the possibility of extreme outcomes or believes that such 
outcomes can be managed away.  We have discussed the fragility of high-technology projects 
and how easily they are upset by random events.  And we have seen how management is slow 
to learn. 
Thus we are now ready to explain why extreme cost growth occurs and what can be done to 
address it.  The key component in the failure of any organization to prevent extreme cost 
growth is the lack of independent cost estimates and assessments being presented to and 
discussed by senior management.  A second and equally important component is a lack of an 
independent technical review, whose results are reported to and discussed by the senior 
decision makers. 
When only one point of view is presented, that of the project manager, senior decision makers 
are deprived of information and put into a position of thinking they must make a yes or no 
decision.  Decision-makers believe that their options are limited.  When we are put into a 
situation where we believe our choices appear to be limited, we are narrow framing the 
problem.   
Humans by nature prefer problems that are simple.  We are also risk-averse.  If you have ever 
dealt with a competent car salesperson, you have experienced narrow framing first-hand.  A 
good car salesperson will lead you to see the decision, to buy or not to buy, as a loss if you do 
not buy and a win if you do.  They do this by using human psychology to get you to eliminate 
other alternatives (keeping your old car) and playing on your fear of loss (you will miss a great 
opportunity).  By the way, most car salespeople don’t take psychology classes to learn how to 
do this.  Their techniques are based on thousands of years of trial and error by salesmen and 
saleswomen.  That is why they are so effective. 
Now, we are not trying to equate project managers with car salespeople.  But it is true that 
when the decision makers are only told one side of the story, it is easier for management to 
accept the project’s position.  To do otherwise would be to turn down the possibility of success 
by accepting the sure failure (by saying no).  When presented with more than one point of view, 
decision makers are forced to consider other possible outcomes.  Incorporating an independent 
cost risk analysis, or as well we see, a joint cost schedule risk analysis, into the discussion goes 
even further, by giving decision-makers a sense of the risk involved in accepting the project’s 
position and some understanding into how that risk, if considered too high, can be mitigated. 
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To effectively counter our tendency to narrow frame, senior management must create a culture 
that values and expects to see alternative points of view.  A management culture that is not 
willing to entertain independent assessments of their projects is probably a management 
culture more focused on selling projects than on successfully executing projects. 
One final note: independent cost estimates and assessments will not eliminate extreme cost 
growth.  But such practices can reduce the possibility.  The alternative, failure to perform 
independent assessments of high-technology projects, guarantees that extreme cost growth 
will occur. 
Some Observations from DoD 
The Department of Defense has a management culture that creates its own challenges to 
effective project management.  Some of these challenges are shared by NASA project 
managers.  One that can affect both organizations (though perhaps to different degrees) is 
learned helplessness. 
Learned helplessness starts with the situation that many government project managers find 
themselves in: they are responsible for the project’s success but they are not the ultimate 
authority.  In other words, some decisions (usually the big ones like major requirements 
changes) must be approved by a higher authority.  This puts the project manager in the position 
of having to justify and defend important changes that he or she believes are necessary for 
project success.   Learned helplessness is exacerbated when project managers have to live with 
suboptimal decisions imposed upon them by their boss or by a key stakeholder, such as 
Congress. 
This loss of control creates a psychic stress (in what is already a very stressful job) that can 
make the project manager feel helpless.  Once a project manager begins to feel helpless, they 
lose their motivation, their sense of responsibility.  Demotivation and a loss of responsibility 
leads to degraded performance.  Degraded performance increases the likelihood of cost 
growth. 
Another DoD culture challenge to good project management is the high turnover of uniformed 
project personnel.  These military officers are typically only in the job for two or three years.  
Thus, poor decisions by these short-term project managers often will not bear fruit until they 
have moved to their next assignment.  Since they are not affected by the consequences of their 
decisions, they lack what Taleb calls skin in the game. 
Is the Joint Cost Schedule Confidence Level the Solution? 
The philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz is noted for a variety of contributions 
including the co-discovery of Calculus and invention of binary numbers. However, his optimism, 
particularly his phrase that we live in the “best of all possible worlds,” has been heavily 
lampooned, including by Voltaire and the singer/songwriter/actor Kris Kristofferson. Modern 
program managers however seem to have adopted this philosophy wholeheartedly, especially 
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when it comes to cost. This is one of the primary reasons that cost growth is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon in government programs. 
A recent claim that joint confidence level analysis is reducing cost growth may be proving 
effective at corralling cost growth, according to a recent study of 13 missions. As you can see in 
Exhibit 5 below, the average overrun for these 13 missions from Systems Requirements Review 
(SRR) was 23.9%, with a range from -28.7% to +81.1%.   Average cost growth of -2.7% from the 
Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC), which is the milestone when the JCL is performed is even 
better. 
 
Exhibit 5: Cost Performance for JCL Projects. 
This is a small sample, so a legitimate question is whether or not this was just good luck? Small 
samples are notorious for not being representative of the underlying population and are 
exceptionally prone to the influence of noise. As a result, our initial hypothesis was that this 
sample is too small to be conclusive. In order to test this hypothesis, we compared this recent 
success to the larger set of cost growth data from Exhibit 1. This larger data set is more 
representative of typical government experience, with mean growth equal to 56.2 % and a 
range from -26.8% to 498.3%.  
In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted a means comparison test, assuming that cost 
growth is lognormally distributed. The test was run using the cost growth data from SRR since 
this is what most closely matches the data in Exhibit 1.  This results in a statistically significant 
difference. In log-space, the distributions are both normal. The difference of the two 
distributions is also normal. The combined mean is 0.3040, and the combined standard 
deviation of the means is 0.1786. Using a t-test with 12 degrees of freedom and the hypothesis 
that the difference is zero yielded a p-value equal to 5.7%. If we adopt the 5% Fisherian 
threshold, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two sample means are not different. This is 
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a strict criterion aimed at rejecting a true hypothesis, since there is less than a 6% chance of 
seeing differences this extreme if our null hypothesis is correct. 
To take another look at the data, we used the larger sample of data as an empirical distribution. 
We took samples of 13 data points without replacement from the 132 data points. We ran 
1,000,000 iterations. The range of average cost growth for the samples was -0.8% to 168.1%. 
The overall mean was 52.0%, similar to the overall mean. There were 2 samples with mean less 
than 0% and 369 with mean less than 10%. See the Exhibit 6 for a histogram of these sampled 
values.  
 
Exhibit 6.  Histogram of Sampled Values. 
In 1,000,000 trials, 37,678 had an average cost as small as the 13 recent missions, or less, which 
is approximately 3.8% of the trials.  
Thus, there is some evidence that joint confidence level analysis is curtailing cost growth. 
However, using a standard statistical test and using a standard threshold for p-values that is 
commonly used in science, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the two samples.  So, while these early results are promising, the sample size is too small to 
make definitive conclusions. 
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A Candidate Predictive Model 
Most cost analysts are familiar with regression analysis, which when used to estimate cost, is a 
predictive technique that results in a continuous output variable, either dollars or hours. We 
have begun development of a model to predict whether or not extreme cost growth occurs, 
which we defined as cost growth in excess of 100%. This is a discrete outcome. This type of 
modeling is called classification. In order to model this we need to look at a technique different 
from classical regression analysis. The tool that we have used is called “logistic regression,” 
which predicts log odds of success which ranges from 0 to 1. In order to classify the prediction 
into success or failure, we choose a cutoff point.  Anything below that point we predict that it 
will not have extreme cost growth, and anything above that value we predict that it will 
experience extreme cost growth. 
We estimate the outcome as 
x
x
e
e
xp
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




 . The graph of p is the well-known S curve, and 
is bounded between 0 and 1. A graph of p is shown in Exhibit 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 7. The Logistic Curve. 
 
The observed values of p, which we denote by y, are either 0 (failure) or 1 (success). Thus the 
conditional distribution of y does not follow a Normal distribution, but rather a binomial 
distribution. Therefore, linear regression cannot be used to estimate the parameters  
10 and  . However, the method of maximum likelihood can be used. The  
likelihood function is ii
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These are nonlinear equations that do not have closed-formed solutions. Iterative numerical 
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methods must be used to solve these equations. We used the R statistical language for model 
calculation. 
This is the case for one independent variable, or when one input parameter is used. In our 
model, several independent variables are used, and a natural extension of p is calculated as 
)(
)(
1
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xg
xg
e
e
xp 


  , where nnxxxxg   ...)( 22110

. The maximum likelihood method 
also extends to multiple independent variables. 
The use of logistic regression arose in epidemiological research, and is now commonly 
employed in business and finance, ecology, engineering, health policy, and linguistics. 
We have some experience with using the logistic regression model for classification. Christian 
developed a logistic regression model in the early 2000s to predict technical mission success for 
robotic earth-orbiting and planetary spacecraft. (Smart 2002) 
The hypothesis is that extreme cost growth is due in large part to disconnects between cost, 
schedule, and technical performance plans. For example, if the technical performance is high 
relative to the initial estimate, the cost will grow in order to meet that performance. Likewise, if 
the schedule is too short given the scale of the project, the schedule will slip, leading to cost 
growth. We used the cost and schedule data from the recent study by Andy Prince (2017) for 
the initial cost and schedule estimates, and Dr. Joe Hamaker’s QuickCost version 5.0 for a 
variety of technical and programmatic parameters for use in the model. 
The parameters we considered for the model are: initial cost; initial schedule;  spacecraft 
complexity; instrument complexity; whether or not the mission is earth-orbiting or planetary; 
whether or not the budget was capped; and whether or not the mission was mostly designed 
and built in-house by the government. 
We had 69 data points. Of those 69, 17 experienced cost growth in excess of 100%. Our model 
predicted 7 of those, slightly less than 60%. The model also predicted 11 instances of extreme 
cost growth when there was none. These results are displayed in Exhibit 8. 
 
Exhibit 8. Model Predictions – Actuals vs. Predicted. 
There is clearly room for improvement but our initial model shows some promise that extreme 
cost growth can be predicted. One additional factor we plan to investigate that we did not 
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include in this version is interaction effects, which we believe will improve the accuracy of the 
model. 
A Few General Observations 
During our years in the field of cost estimating and analysis, we have made a few observations 
that appear, dare we say, obvious to us, yet sometimes seem to elude the most intelligent 
project managers and systems designers.  Therefore, we offer these heuristics not as hard and 
fast rules, but rather as things to be on the lookout for when considering the possibility of 
extreme cost growth. 
Our first observation is that if a system is more complex than previous similar systems, it should 
cost more than these predecessor systems.  As a fellow cost engineer, you are probably 
thinking that this one is too obvious to even be mentioned.  In our defense we offer the 
example in Exhibit 5.   
The second observation is that the greater the number of cost-saving assumptions, the greater 
the probability of cost growth.  This observation is really a summation of the problem of over-
specification discussed above in the section titled “History as an Illusion,” so we will not belabor 
the point. 
The third observation is that in general, technology advances will not reduce cost.  We have 
observed over the years that development projects which rely on promising new technologies 
often realize greater cost overruns due to those technologies not being sufficiently mature at 
the start of development.  Companies that product large, complex commercial products, such 
as aircraft and automobiles, typically only include two or three new technologies in a new 
model, so as to minimize the risk of development cost overruns and operational reliability 
issues.  Early versions of the SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket relied heavily on existing technologies.  
Sometimes new technologies will have a cost and/or schedule benefit, so the cost analyst needs 
to be careful in applying this heuristic too liberally. 
The fourth observation is that the more important the project is to the organization, the more it 
will cost.  Important projects tend to be highly visible to outside stakeholders.  Projects that 
have more visibility attract more resources, as organizations typically invest to insure success.  
Often these high-visibility projects attempt to achieve lofty goals, such as hitting a nuclear 
warhead with a projectile or designing a fighter jet that can satisfy the requirements of the Air 
Force, Navy, and Marines.  Important and highly visible projects that expand capabilities and 
drive technology development are a recipe for extreme cost growth. 
The final observation we want to share is this: if you are told up front what a project is going to 
cost, before any cost estimates have been done, it is a really, really bad sign.  For an example, 
re-read the JWST story above.  When you are told up front what the cost will be, needs to be, 
or even the budget wedge that the project needs to fit in, your estimate is being anchored.   
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Numerous studies show that anchoring influences cost estimates.  It is very difficult to 
overcome an anchor.  You cannot forget what you have learned.  Even worse, your customer is 
now anchored.  Once anchored it is very difficult to provide an objective cost estimate.  We 
have even heard project managers say “It can’t cost more than X, because that is the budget,” 
as if the budget determines the cost estimate. 
Conclusions 
Last year we began this study with the hypothesis that it is the environment surrounding a 
project that creates the conditions for extreme cost growth.  After studying the histories of 
NASA projects that had extreme cost growth, we have not found any evidence to disprove that 
hypothesis.  In fact, what we found confirms that extreme cost growth is a failure of 
organizational leadership.  The specific technical or programmatic factors leading to extreme 
cost growth (such as overestimating technology readiness or underestimating cost) have, at 
their root, a management culture that does not want or value independent cost and technical 
assessments as part of their decision-making process. 
Alternative assessments by independent analysts is key to counteracting optimism and other 
biases inherent in successful project management.  Ideally, these assessments are done by an 
organization that is independent of the advocacy organization.  Application of the Joint 
Confidence Level (JCL) analysis to NASA projects, by independent review teams, appears to be a 
forcing function that is leading to good management practices.  While it is too early to 
definitively say that JCL is a success, results so far are promising. 
Randomness hinders our ability to identify a priori which projects will and will not experience 
extreme cost growth.  Randomness also limits the ability of managers to assume their way to 
lower cost.  Probability trumps determinism.  Early research into a predictive model for 
identifying which projects will experience extreme cost growth produced mixed results.  Better 
data, or more likely, a better way to model the conditions surrounding the formulation of a 
project, may ultimately bear fruit. 
Finally, do not expect perfection, either in yourself or in your senior leadership.  One of the 
great truths of life is that most of us are doing the best we can with what we got.  Encourage 
good behavior when you see it.  Stand up and be counted when you see harm being done.  It 
takes great courage to point out that the emperor has no clothes.  May we all be so 
courageous. 
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Appendix A 
How heavy-tailed are cost risk distributions? 
The financial analyst and writer Nassim Taleb calls phenomena that follow a normal distribution 
as belonging to “Mediocristan,” which means that these phenomena don’t vary much around 
the mean or median. An alternative to Mediocristan is what Taleb terms “Extremistan,” where 
there is extreme variation around the mean and median. A large number of phenomena fit in 
this category. Fluctuations is the stock market is a prime example, as is economic loss due to 
hurricanes (just think of the damage done by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017). 
Income and net worth also belong to this category, just think of Bill Gate’s net worth compared 
to your own. Book sales per author, populations of cities,  and word usage in a vocabulary also 
belong in this category. (Taleb 2007) 
If costs for defense and NASA programs belong to Mediocristan, it has significant policy and risk 
management implications. In a world in which costs have limited variation, they are easy to 
predict. There is also a pronounced portfolio effect, so it is easy to reduce the limited risk of a 
single program even further by combining these programs with other programs to achieve a 
portfolio effect. In such a world, we can fund projects to percentiles slightly above the mean 
and achieve high confidence levels for an entire organization. 
However, as shown by one of the authors in previous papers (Smart 2009, 2012 (a) and (b)), 
there is more variation in cost than we would expect if costs follow a normal distribution, and 
there is no portfolio effect. Thus it is clear that historically cost risk does not belong to the low 
risk realm of Mediocristan. 
There are two primary possibilities for cost risk in this case. Either cost risk follows a power law 
distribution, or it follows a lognormal distribution. The power law is a case where risk is the 
extreme fluctuations of Extremistan, while the lognormal represents a middle ground where 
the risks are more extreme than those of Mediocristan but they are not quite as wild as those 
of Extremistan. 
A prominent example of a heavy-tailed distribution is the Pareto distribution, which is defined 
as  
𝒇(𝒙) =
𝜶𝜽𝜶
(𝒙 + 𝜽)𝜶+𝟏
 
for 𝒙 ≥ 𝟎. The parameter 𝜶 determines the degree of heaviness of the tail. When 𝜶 ≥ 𝟐 the 
first two moments (mean and standard deviation) are both finite. But when 𝟏 ≤ 𝜶 ≤ 𝟐 only the 
mean is finite but the standard deviation is not, and when 𝟎 ≤ 𝜶 ≤ 𝟏, neither the mean nor the 
standard deviation is finite. The cumulative distribution function is defined as  
𝑭(𝒙) = 𝟏 − (
𝜽
𝒙 + 𝜽
)
𝜶
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The lognormal distribution has finite mean and variance but has a heavier right tail than a 
normal distribution. Like a lognormal, cost cannot be less than zero. And cost uncertainty is 
skewed – there are more risks for growth than there are opportunities for cost savings, just like 
with a lognormal. The normal on the other hand is symmetric. 
The probability density function of a lognormally distributed random variable X is defined as  
𝒇𝑿(𝒙) =
𝟏
𝒙𝝈√𝟐𝝅
𝒆
−
(𝒍𝒏𝒙−𝝁)𝟐
𝟐𝝈𝟐  
where  and  are mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the log transform of X, i.e., 
ln(X). 
The relationships between the log-space mean and standard deviation and their unit space 
counterparts, i.e., E[X] and Var[X], are given by 
𝑬[𝑿] = 𝒆𝝁+
𝝈𝟐
𝟐  
𝑽𝒂𝒓[𝑿] = (𝒆𝝈
𝟐
− 𝟏)𝒆𝟐𝝁+𝝈
𝟐
 
and 
𝝁 = 𝒍𝒏 (
𝑬[𝑿]𝟐
√𝑬[𝑿]𝟐 + 𝑽𝒂𝒓[𝑿]
) 
𝝈 = √𝒍𝒏 (𝟏 +
𝑽𝒂𝒓[𝑿]
𝑬[𝑿]𝟐
) 
The pth percentile of a lognormal distribution, denoted by p, is defined as  
𝜶𝒑 = 𝒆
𝝁+𝝓−𝟏(𝒑)𝝈 
Where 𝝓−𝟏(𝒑) denotes the standard normal distribution evaluated at p. 
While normally distributed random variable has no lower or upper bound, a lognormally 
distributed random variable has no upper bound and is bounded below by zero. 
However, cost will not decrease from its initial starting point to a level that is close to zero, but 
that is possible and even probably with a two-parameter lognormal. Once cost is established 
there is a limited amount of variation to the downside. To account for this we can model cost 
risk as a three-parameter lognormal. The third parameter is a location parameter that fixes the 
minimum of the distribution to a fixed positive value. 
As discussed in Smart (2018), cost risk better fits a three-parameter lognormal than a two-
parameter lognormal. 
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We first examine the case for the lognormal. The theoretical argument for the lognormal is that 
changes in costs over time are proportional to prior costs. This makes sense. Cost is more likely 
to increase than decrease over time, as evidenced by numerous studies on cost growth that 
show that over 80% of government projects experience cost growth, and on average increase 
by over 50% (Smart 2015). So when we talk about cost changes, we almost always mean cost 
increases. Cost increases often do not result in funding increases in the short term due to 
funding constraints. Thus cost increases will result in longer schedules. Longer schedules imply 
a longer period in which the personnel devoted to a project will charge to that particular 
project. Larger projects have more personnel assigned to a project, meaning that increases in 
cost will result in a proportional increase in cost. 
Mathematically the change in cost from time t-1 to time t can be represented as  
𝑿𝒕 − 𝑿𝒕−𝟏 = 𝝐𝒕𝑿𝒕−𝟏 
where the 𝝐𝒕′𝒔 are mutually independent and independent of 𝑋𝑡−1. Rearranging, we have that  
𝑿𝒕−𝑿𝒕−𝟏
𝑿𝒕−𝟏
= 𝝐𝒕. 
Summing over t we find that 
∑
𝑿𝒕−𝑿𝒕−𝟏
𝑿𝒕−𝟏
𝒏
𝒕=𝟏 = ∑ 𝝐𝒕
𝒏
𝒕=𝟏 . 
 
Proportional changes can be approximated as 
∑
𝑿𝒕 − 𝑿𝒕−𝟏
𝑿𝒕−𝟏
𝒏
𝒕=𝟏
≈ ∫
𝒅𝑿
𝑿
𝑿𝒏
𝑿𝟎
= 𝒍𝒏(𝑿𝒏) − 𝒍𝒏(𝑿𝟎) 
Thus 
𝒍𝒏(𝑿𝒏) − 𝒍𝒏(𝑿𝟎) ≈ ∑ 𝝐𝒕
𝒏
𝒕=𝟏
 
Rearranging terms we find that  
𝒍𝒏(𝑿𝒏) ≈ 𝒍𝒏(𝑿𝟎) + ∑ 𝝐𝒕
𝒏
𝒕=𝟏
 
According to the Central Limit Theorem the sum of many random variables is normally 
distributed. Thus for large values of n, ln(Xn) is normally distributed. Thus by definition Xn is 
lognormally distributed. 
However, only a slight change to this generative model is needed to turn the lognormal into a 
power law. An additional assumption that cost has a lower bound is all that is needed to change 
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the distribution to a power law. (Mitzenmacher 2003). This is a reasonable assumption since 
once a contract is signed, it is not likely for costs to decrease at all.  
Empirically, there is evidence for both power laws and lognormal distributions. Based on a 
sample of 289 data points, Smart (2015) found that the lognormal tail was a better fit than a 
power-law type distribution. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. A lognormal is a better fit for the tail than a power-law distribution. Source: Smart 
2015 
Figure 1 displays the results of a lognormal fit to the right tail in comparison with a type of 
heavy-tailed distribution called the Levy-Stable. The Levy Stable distribution has a right tail 
governed by power laws. 
How well does the lognormal fit the 133 NASA data points that is considered in this study? See 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Lognormal fits the body of the distribution well, but underestimates the right tail. 
In order to provide a better fit in the tail, we fit a lognormal distribution up to the 80th 
percentile, and a Pareto above the 80th percentile. This provides a better fit for the tail while 
still modeling the body of the distribution well. See Figure 3 for a graphical comparison. 
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Figure 3. Lognormal-Pareto splice provides a better tail fit while still modeling the body of the 
distribution well. 
Thus the lognormal was a better fit for the bulk of the distribution (up to the 80h percentile), 
but a Pareto distribution better fit the right tail, indicating the extreme risks follow a power law 
distribution. In this case, the alpha parameter is between 1 and 3, indicating finite mean but an 
infinite variance. This model puts cost growth decidedly in the territory of Extremistan. This 
helps explains why we as cost estimators have such a challenge with providing accurate 
estimates – in the case of extreme risk, point estimates are not useful from a predictive 
standpoint. 
See Table 1 for a comparison of the odds of cost growth greater than a variety of large 
percentages. This table compares the Pareto tail from Figure 3 with the lognormal tail from 
Figure 2. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the Lognormal and Pareto tails for modeling cost growth. 
As is evident from the table, the odds of extreme cost growth is very small for the lognormal. 
The odds that a program would experience 1,000% cost growth for example, is practically 
impossible for  a lognormal, while for a Pareto the odds are only a little less than 1%. The 
Pareto may be a little conservative, but the lognormal does not provide realistic odds of 
extreme growth. For example, the James Webb Space Telescope is one program that is not 
included in the 133 data points. This next generation space telescope is a successor to Hubble 
and truly cutting edge technology, just as was Hubble when it was launched. Like Hubble, it has 
also experienced cost growth of approximately 5.5% to date, more than any program in the 
database we have analyzed in this paper. The lognormal predicts the odds of this amount of 
cost growth to be 1 in 2,940, while the odds with a Pareto are much higher, 1 in 70. If we were 
to add this data point to the database it would be 1 of 134 data points, so the empirical 
probability would be between that predicted by the Pareto and lognormal, but closer to the 
Pareto than the lognormal. 
The case for the lognormal is that programs that experience extreme cost growth will likely be 
cancelled. There are many such instances in history. The counterargument is that in many 
instances, even when a program experiences extreme cost growth it is such a high priority that 
even though funding constraints may limit the cost spent in one year, the schedule will slip, and 
resource will be re-allocated from other lower priority programs in order to pay for the 
Odds of Cost 
Growth Greater 
Than:
Lognormal Tail Pareto Tail
100% 1 in 8 1 in 7
250% 1 in 94 1 in 25
500% 1 in 1,800 1 in 63
1,000% 1 in 100,000 1 in 156
2,000% 1 in 15 million 1` in 393
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program. An example of this is the James Webb Space Telescope. Other notable examples are 
the Apollo program, and National Missile Defense, which the George W. Bush administration 
poured funding into to meet a tight deadline. The case for the lognormal is also buttressed by 
the fact that the wild risks of the stock market and natural disasters cannot be easily mitigated 
while government projects are more easily controlled. Scope can be removed in many cases, 
and fixes can be made to improve project performance. The counterargument again is that in 
many cases, the technology is so cutting edge that little can be done to reduce costs – it will 
cost what it costs. 
In the end I believe that the answer to the question “does cost risk follow a lognormal or a 
Pareto distribution, at least in the tails?” is, in so many cases, “it depends.” My hypothesis is 
that if a program is not a high priority, then it will be cancelled if costs spiral out of control, and 
that costs can be reined in as long as the technology is not too cutting edge. Otherwise we are 
looking at a power law case. See Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Cases when extreme cost risk is a lognormal vs. a Pareto. 
If we can either cancel a program or rein in the cost performance with mitigation, then cost risk 
follows a lognormal. Otherwise, we are looking at a truly wild risk, Taleb-type Extremistan risk 
for a program.  
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Appendix B 
Data Sources for NASA Cost Growth Study 
The following table provides the source material for Exhibit 4, Summary of NASA Cost Growth 
Studies. 
 
